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I. INTRODUCTION
As the United States and other countries rely more and more on
complex infrastructures that are primarily controlled by information
technology, and cyber threats against nations become a reality, clear
international laws on cyber threats become a necessity. In light of the fact
that the United States and other nations may use cyber capabilities
offensively as well as defensively, it is even more important that the laws
for engaging in such cyber conflict are clear. This is especially true in the
case of cyber exploitation because the effects of such exploitations can be
far-reaching, but the international law regarding these exploitations is far
from clear. Currently, it seems unlikely that cyber exploitation can ever be
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regarded as a threat or use of force under the UN Charter because it is
typically regarded as espionage, which is permissible internationally.
This Note first analyzes whether it is the case that cyber exploitation
cannot constitute a threat or use of force and then analyzes whether that
should be the case. Section II focuses on cyber attack and cyber
exploitation generally, explaining the differences between the two threats
and the similarities in the ways the two threats are carried out. Section III
discusses what body of law is applicable to cyber attack and cyber
exploitation when a nation engages in or defends against one of these
threats, specifically the Laws of Armed Conflict (“LOAC”) and the UN
Charter. Section IV discusses some of the primary difficulties in applying
LOAC and the UN Charter to cyber threats. Section V analyzes whether
cyber exploitation, under current governing law, can ever constitute a use
of force, constitute a threat of force, or justify anticipatory self-defense.
This section concludes that cyber exploitation, by itself, likely cannot
constitute a threat or use of force under current law. Section VI then
analyzes whether cyber exploitation should continue to be treated similar to
traditional espionage in the international setting, which would result in it
never being considered a threat or use of force. This section argues that
cyber exploitation should be treated differently than traditional espionage
and lays out several reasons why this should be the case. Ultimately, this
Note concludes that because cyber exploitation is so different from
traditional espionage, cyber exploitation should be able to constitute a
threat or use of force by itself in some cases. In situations where it does not
rise to the level of threat or use of force, it should still be prohibited
internationally because it can be so much more destructive than traditional
espionage.
While this Note primarily focuses on the questions surrounding cyber
exploitation, the similarities between cyber attack and cyber exploitation
make the discussion of cyber attack in this paper requisite. Because there
has not been much written on the subject of cyber exploitation or cyber
attacks and how they should be dealt with in an international “armed
conflict” sense, the majority of the background information in this Note is
founded on information presented in the 2009 National Research Council
1
Report (“NRC Report”).

1. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS REGARDING
U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 1 (William A. Owens, Kenneth
W. Dam & Herbert S. Lin eds., 2009) [hereinafter NRC REPORT].
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II. CYBER ATTACK AND CYBER EXPLOITATION
A.

Difference Between Cyber Attacks and Cyber Exploitations
Generally

Cyber attacks and cyber exploitations are the two forms of hostile
2
actions that may be taken against a computer system or network. While
many people lump these two categories together under the title of cyber
attacks, cyber attack and cyber exploitation are two distinct actions.
According to the NRC Report, “[c]yber attack refers to deliberate actions to
alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy computer systems or networks or
the information and/or programs resident in or transiting these systems or
3
networks.” The purpose of a cyber attack is to make adversary computer
systems and networks less useful to the adversary by making them
4
unavailable or untrustworthy. Cyber exploitation, on the other hand, refers
to “the use of cyber offensive actions . . . usually for the purpose of
obtaining information resident on or transiting through an adversary’s
5
computer systems or networks.” The main difference between cyber attack
and cyber exploitation is that cyber attack is destructive in nature while
cyber exploitation is focused on intelligence gathering and, in order to be
covert, purposely does not try to affect the normal processes of the
computer or network exploited.

B.

Comparison of Cyber Attacks and Cyber Exploitations

With regard to operational considerations, cyber exploitation and
cyber attack are very similar. Both cyber attack and cyber exploitation
require a vulnerability, access to the vulnerability, and a payload to be
6
executed. The payload to be executed, though, differs between the two.
Cyber exploitation requires that the execution of the payload be
accomplished clandestinely, while secrecy is often far less important with

2. Herbert S. Lin, Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use of Force, 4 J. NAT’L
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 63, 63 (2010).
3. NRC REPORT, supra note 1. The NRC Report states that “[a]n adversary computer
or network may not necessarily be owned and operated by the adversary—it may simply
support or be used by the adversary.” Id. at 11 n.4.
4. Id. at 11.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 20 (“For a computer or network, a vulnerability is an aspect of the system that
can be used by the attacker to compromise [the system] . . . .”). Vulnerabilities can be
introduced either intentionally or accidentally. Id. at 83. “Payload is the term used to
describe the things that can be done once a vulnerability has been exploited.” Id. at 88.
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cyber attacks because the effects of the cyber attack are often readily
7
apparent to the target.
The process of intelligence gathering necessary to penetrate an
adversary’s computer or network is almost identical for both cyber
8
exploitation and cyber attack. Both cyber attack and cyber exploitation use
the same kind of access paths to reach their targets and also “take
9
advantage of the same vulnerabilities to deliver their payloads.” Because
of the aforementioned similarities, an adversary’s intent is often extremely
10
difficult, if not impossible, to determine. This topic will be revisited later
in this Note.

III. LOAC AND THE UN CHARTER
A.

Laws That Apply to Cyber Attack and Cyber Exploitation
Generally

The rules that apply when a nation engages in or defends against a
cyber attack or cyber exploitation are not entirely clear. Although cyberspecific rules have been created in many instances for cybercrime, nations
have not created cyber-specific rules for the actions they take against other
11
nations. Therefore, most international laws have to be applied by analogy.
The main body of relevant international laws, and the body of laws most
pertinent for the discussion of this Note, is the LOAC.

B.

The Law of Armed Conflict
1. Jus Ad Bellum and Jus In Bello

LOAC addresses two questions: (1) “[W]hen is it legal for a nation to
use force against another nation?” and (2) “[W]hat are the rules that govern
12
the behavior of combatants who are engaged in armed conflict?” The law
governing when a nation can use force against another nation is known as
13
jus ad bellum. Jus ad bellum refers to “those established ‘conflict
management’ norms and procedures that dictate when a state may—and

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 20–21.
Id. at 155.
Id.
Id.
Duncan B. Hollis, An e-SOS for Cyberspace, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 373, 393 (2011).
NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 242.
Id.
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may not—legitimately use force as an instrument of dispute resolution.”
The law governing when nations are involved in armed conflict, which is
15
separate and distinct from jus ad bellum, is known as jus in bello.
Because this Note focuses on whether or not cyber exploitations can ever
constitute a “threat or use of force” that would permit a targeted nation to
retaliate, jus ad bellum is the relevant body of law.

2. Specific Laws Governing Jus Ad Bellum
According to the NRC Report, “[j]us ad bellum is governed by the UN
Charter, interpretations of the UN Charter, and some customary
international law that has developed in connection with and sometimes
16
prior to the UN Charter.” Jus ad bellum and the UN Charter specifically
17
apply to covert action such as cyber exploitation. The UN Charter
provisions most applicable to jus ad bellum are Articles 2(4), 39, 41, 42,
18
and 51.
The aforementioned articles of the UN Charter lay out the basic
framework of jus ad bellum. Article 2(4) sets forth the prohibition against
19
the threat or use of force. Specifically, Article 2(4) prohibits every nation
from using “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
20
with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Professor Wingfield of the U.S.
Army Command and General Staff College testified to the committee
putting together the NRC Report that some threats that might constitute
“threats of force” according to Article 2(4) include “verbal threats, initial
troop movements, initial movement of ballistic missiles, massing of troops
on a border, use of fire control radars, and interference with early warning
21
or command and control systems.”
Articles 39, 41, and 42 define the Security Council’s authority. Article
39 gives the Security Council the authority to “determine the existence of
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and [to]
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
14. David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. &
POL’Y 87 (2010) (citing John Norton Moore, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 29 (John Norton
Moore & Robert F. Turner eds., 2d ed. 2005).
15. NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 242.
16. Id. (emphasis omitted).
17. Id.
18. See Graham, supra note 14, at 88; Lin, supra note 2, at 71; NRC REPORT, supra
note 1, at 257.
19. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
20. Id.
21. NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 242.
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accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international
22
peace and security.” In Article 41, the Security Council is given the
authority to “decide what measures not involving the use of armed force
23
are to be employed to give effect to its decisions . . . .” In Article 42, the
Security Council is given the authority to take “such action by air, sea, or
land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace
and security” if it decides “measures provided for in Article 41 would be
24
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate . . . .”
Despite all the aforementioned provisions of the UN Charter, Article
51 states that “[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has
25
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”
Article 51 provides an exception to the absolute prohibition against the use
of force put forth in Article 2(4), permitting nations to use force out of selfdefense. Whether Article 51 recognizes a pre-existent right to self-defense
26
or limits that right of self-defense is presently being debated.
The only other exception to the absolute prohibition against the use of
force is that set forth in Article 39, which states that nations are allowed to
27
use force if given permission by the Security Council. Articles 39 and 42,
28
together, allow the Security Council to authorize uses of force. An
important note is that a nation does not need Security Council permission
29
in order to act in self-defense as permitted by Article 51.
In some instances, nations are allowed to act out of “anticipatory self30
defense” before an attack has even been launched. Although this right is
not explicitly stated in Article 51, when a nation is facing an unambiguous
attack, it is widely accepted that the interpretation of Article 51 allows a
31
nation to act out of self-defense prior to the attack. This right of
anticipatory self-defense is explained in Oppenheim’s International Law,
where it states:
[T]he use of armed force and the violation of another state’s territory,
can be justified as self-defence under international law where: (a) an
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

U.N. Charter art. 39.
Id. at art. 41.
Id. at art. 42.
Id. at art. 51.
NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 243.
Graham, supra note 14, at 88; U.N. Charter arts. 39, 51.
U.N. Charter arts. 39, 42; Lin, supra note 2, at 71.
NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 243. See U.N. Charter art. 51.
NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 243.
U.N. Charter art. 51; NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 243.
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armed attack is launched, or is immediately threatened, against a state’s
territory or forces . . . (b) there is an urgent necessity for defensive
action against that attack; (c) there is no practicable alternative to
action in self-defence, . . . [and] (d) the action taken by way of selfdefence is limited to what is necessary to stop or prevent the
32
infringement . . . .

When a nation can use anticipatory self-defense, though, is not clear. Often,
the “threatened party is likely to have a rather different perception of such
33
facts and circumstances than the threatening state.” The NRC Report
explains:
The mere fact that Zendia possesses destructive capabilities that could
be used against Ruritania cannot be sufficient to indicate imminent
attack—otherwise, the mere existence of armed forces of an adversary
would be sufficient justification. But if Zendia can use these
capabilities effectively against Ruritania and with serious
consequences without warning, and Zendia has indicated hostile intent
toward Ruritania in other (perhaps nonmilitary) ways, outside
observers may indeed be more likely to judge that the conditions for
34
anticipatory self-defense have been met.

IV. DIFFICULTIES APPLYING LOAC AND UN CHARTER
PROVISIONS
What specifically counts as a threat or use of force under Article 2(4)
in a cyber context? Because of the technology used in cyber attacks and
cyber exploitations, it is very difficult to actually apply LOAC and UN
Charter provisions. Oftentimes, the only way to apply LOAC and UN
Charter provisions is through analogy. Below, this Note discusses some of
the main reasons that applying LOAC and UN Charter provisions to cyber
attacks and cyber exploitations is difficult.

A.

Physical Injury and Destruction vs. Infrastructure Controlled by
Technology

Much of society today relies on an infrastructure that is controlled in
large part by information technology. Interference with that infrastructure,
regardless of whether physical damage is caused, can constitute an armed
35
attack under Article 51. In order to determine if a cyber attack or
exploitation should constitute a threat or use of force, the effects of the
attack or exploitation are the most important aspect of the threats to
32. 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 422 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th
ed. 1992).
33. NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 243.
34. Id. at 243, 246.
35. Id. at 254.
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36

analyze. If the effects produced by a cyber threat would constitute a use
of force if produced by other means under LOAC and the UN Charter, then
37
38
the threat will likely constitute a use of force. The opposite is also true.

B.

Cyber Attack Weapons Are Readily Available, Not Just
Available to Governments

The technology needed to launch a cyber attack or exploitation is
widely available today. Nonstate actors can launch cyber attacks and
exploitations quite easily and can often do just as much harm as state
39
actors. The inability to know whether an actor is a state actor or not
makes applying LOAC and the UN Charter difficult because these laws are
built upon the presumption that it is clear when LOAC should be applied
40
and when national criminal laws should be applied.

C.

Presumption of Nation-to-Nation Conflict Between National
Military Forces

Closely related to the last difficulty discussed, LOAC and UN Charter
provisions assume that the actors are nations and that national military
41
forces are involved in the conflict. LOAC and UN Charter provisions are
much harder to apply when nonstate actors must be taken into
42
consideration.

D.

The Interconnection of Military and Civilian Information
Technology

Furthermore, today military and civilian information technology is
43
interconnected. The “LOAC and UN Charter [are] based on the idea that
44
civilian and military assets can be separated . . . .” Because this is not the
case in the cyber realm, directly applying LOAC and UN Charter
provisions is extremely difficult.

36. See Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in
International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885
(1999); Jason Barkham, Information Warfare and International Law on the Use of Force,
34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 57 (2001).
37. NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 272.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 22.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 273.
42. Id. at 273–74.
43. Id. at 35.
44. Id.
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The Exception for Espionage

The LOAC also assumes that espionage and the use of force are two
45
distinct actions. In the cyber realm, however, this is often not the case.
This is an incredibly important point because espionage and uses of force
are treated very differently. Espionage is not deemed an illegal activity
46
under international law, as “there are no treaties or customary norms that
47
explicitly proscribe the practice.” According to Hays Parks:
Each nation endeavors to deny intelligence gathering within its
territory through domestic laws . . . . Prosecution under domestic law
(or the threat thereof) constitutes a form of denial of information rather
than the assertion of a per se violation of international law; domestic
laws are promulgated in such a way as to deny foreign intelligence
collection efforts within a nation's territory without inhibiting that
nation's efforts to collect intelligence about other nations. No serious
proposal has ever been made within the international community to
prohibit intelligence collection as a violation of international law
because of the tacit acknowledgement by nations that it is important to
48
all, and practiced by each.

Nations seem to agree that espionage, among other activities, is not
49
enough to count as a use of force. And many nations recognize cyber
50
exploitation as a new method of espionage. As stated in the NRC Report,
if the legal approach set forth by Hays Parks is accepted, cyber
exploitations, which are generally thought of as espionage conducted
51
through a computer, would be permissible under LOAC. And this could
be the case even if the cyber exploitation is conducted in a manner that
52
could also aid a destructive cyber attack.
Because there are so many similarities between cyber attack and
cyber exploitation, it is often difficult to determine whether a party has
53
been exploited or attacked. Vulnerabilities in many cases can be used for
54
either cyber attack, cyber exploitation, or both. While cyber exploitations
45. Id. at 22.
46. Id. at 259.
47. Robert D. Williams, (Spy) Game Change: Cyber Networks, Intelligence Collection,
and Covert Action, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1162, 1165 (2011).
48. Lin, supra note 2, at 72 (quoting W. Hays Parks, The International Law of
Intelligence Collection, in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 433, 433–34 (John Norton Moore et al.
eds., 1990)).
49. NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 242.
50. Hollis, supra note 11, at 395. See Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came in from
the Cold War: Intelligence and International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1071, 1072 (2006).
51. NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 261.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Hollis, supra note 11, at 386.
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are not typically considered capable of being deemed a use of force, their
similarities to cyber attacks often make it difficult to tell the two types of
actions apart.
Even when an action is limited exclusively to cyber exploitation, the
potential to use that same vulnerability for a later cyber attack is still
55
present. So when do these actions in the cyber context cross the line and
count as threats or uses of force? If someone threatens to use an existing
vulnerability in an adversary computer system or network, does that
56
constitute a threat of force under the UN Charter? What about simply
57
introducing vulnerabilities into an adversary’s system or network? Do
those vulnerabilities have to be used within a certain time period for the
threat to be real? Does there have to be evidence of an imminent attack or
use of the vulnerability first before it can constitute a threat of force? Does
finding a vulnerability alone justify using anticipatory self-defense? These
are just some of the questions that analysts and policy makers are
confronted with in the cyber realm.
Furthermore, the cost to equip a cyber exploitation with the capability
of a later cyber attack is extremely low, and it often makes sense to add
58
such capabilities, whether or not those capabilities will ever be realized.
Because of the ease with which a cyber exploitation can be outfitted to
conduct a cyber attack and the fact that these two cyber threats do not have
to be mutually exclusive, a targeted party oftentimes will not know, and
will have no way of finding out, whether it has been attacked, exploited, or
both. This problem is further compounded because of the time constraints
that often exist when dealing with and making decisions regarding such
59
national threats.

F.

The Problem of Attribution

Discussed briefly above, another difficulty in applying LOAC and the
UN Charter stems from the problem of attribution inherent to cyber
technology. Attribution refers to “the ability to identify the party
responsible for an offensive cyber operation based only on technical
60
indicators and information associated with that operation.” Both the
55. Id.
56. NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 257.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 152 n.60 (“If these [cyber exploitation] tools were to be used against U.S.
citizens . . . legal and/or policy implications might arise if these tools were to have attack
capabilities as well. Thus, the observation is most likely to be true for tools that are not
intended for such use.”).
59. Id. at 273.
60. Lin, supra note 2, at 77.
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LOAC and UN Charter assume that nations are necessarily involved and
61
that those nations are either known or identifiable. However, the very
makeup of the Internet makes attribution in many cases nearly
62
impossible. While some level of attribution can be attained by acquiring
information from nontechnical sources, such as human intelligence, it is
often difficult to ascertain “when an offensive cyber operation has begun,
who the attacker is, and what the operation’s purpose and effects are or
63
were.” And in many cases with cyber attacks and cyber exploitations, the
actor is never discovered. For example, the authors of the 2007 Estonia
attacks, the 2008 Georgian attacks, the July 4, 2009 attacks, and the
implanting of logic bombs in the U.S. power grid are still largely
64
unknown.
The problem of attribution leads to many offshoot difficulties. One of
those difficulties resulting from the problem of attribution is the issue of
geography. When a nation has been the target of a cyber attack or
exploitation, is it the computer’s physical location that is relevant when the
nation is trying to determine what to attack in response, or is it some other
65
geographic location?
Another difficulty resulting from the problem of attribution is
knowing how to treat the action—should it be treated as a crime or an act
66
of war? If the actor is a nation, then the problem should be treated as a
67
national security issue rather than a law enforcement case. If the actor is
misunderstood or misidentified, the wrong set of rules could easily be
68
applied, though, and this could lead to the use of military force.
However, not knowing the actor does not mean that defensive actions
are prohibited. According to the U.S. Defense Department, international
law does not require that an actor must be known before defensive action
69
can be taken. Rather, the responsibility for the attack would be imputed
70
“to the state to whose territory the attack was traced.”

61. See NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 293–94.
62. David D. Clark & Susan Landau, Untangling Attribution, 2 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J.
323, 345–46 (2011).
63. Lin, supra note 2, at 77.
64. Hollis, supra note 11, at 405.
65. See NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 36.
66. Hollis, supra note 11, at 405.
67. Clark & Landau, supra note 62, at 345.
68. Hollis, supra note 11, at 405.
69. Id. at 406.
70. Id.
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V. CYBER EXPLOITATION AS A THREAT OR USE OF FORCE
Given the issues previously discussed, can cyber exploitation ever
constitute a “threat or use of force” under LOAC and the UN Charter?

A.

Cyber Exploitation as a “Use of Force” Under Current Laws

Under the current legal structure, cyber exploitation by itself seems to
clearly never constitute a use of force. As stated above, most countries
consider cyber exploitation a new form of espionage, and espionage
traditionally does not constitute a use of force. While a cyber attack can
constitute a use of force if the effects are such that they traditionally would
have been achieved through a kinetic attack, cyber exploitation is regarded
differently.
However, as shown through the explanation of some of the difficulties
in applying LOAC and UN Charter provisions to the cyber realm and the
discussion of the similarities between cyber attack and exploitation, the
distinctions between cyber attack and exploitation are not always clear.
Because of the similarities between cyber attack and exploitation, targeted
nations will typically not know what kind of cyber threat with which they
are faced. When time constraints in responding to national threats are
subsequently added to the already uncertain situation, it is easy to envision
a nation misinterpreting a cyber threat and responding in a manner that
would escalate the situation to armed conflict when in fact the situation had
started out as a cyber exploitation.

B.

Cyber Exploitation as a Threat of Force Under Current Laws

While it seems pretty clear from the few articles and reports written
on the subject that an isolated cyber exploitation will never by itself
constitute a use of force, there is very little written on the question of
71
whether a cyber exploitation can ever constitute a threat of force. Like a
use of force, it would seem that the detection of an isolated cyber
exploitation would also never constitute a threat of force for the same
reasons. Traditionally, espionage simply cannot justify retaliation in the
72
form of armed conflict. However, it is under the category of threat of
force that there is much more ambiguity; the bar is lower in order for
73
something to qualify as a threat of force. In order for a risk to constitute a
“threat” of force, it is not requisite that there be any physical harm or
readily evident destruction. There simply has to be a threat.
71. See generally NRC REPORT, supra note 1.
72. Espionage, in 4 WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 299 (1998).
73. See NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 257.
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Because the same vulnerabilities can be used to perpetrate an attack,
an exploitation, or both, if a nation identifies a vulnerability in a computer
network that has been taken advantage of (or even simply that a
vulnerability has been accessed in a manner that it can be taken advantage
of easily at a later date), there is practically no way for that nation to tell
what the intent of the attacking party was or is. When does identifying a
vulnerability become a threat of force? Do some initial steps have to be
taken to actually use the accessed vulnerability for a future attack? What if
the vulnerability has already been taken advantage of for exploitation
purposes over time? Can simply identifying the exploitation of information
then constitute a “threat” of force because there is the potential to use the
same vulnerability at a later time to initiate an attack? While it is not likely
that simply identifying a vulnerability that has been used for intelligence
collection would ever constitute a threat of force on its own, perhaps the
combination of an identified vulnerability and other intelligence
information that shows the likelihood of a future attack would be able to
constitute a threat of force.

C.

Cyber Exploitation and Anticipatory Self-Defense Under
Current Laws

Similar to the question of whether cyber exploitation can ever
constitute a threat of force is the question of whether a nation can ever act
out of anticipatory self-defense because of cyber exploitation. While, as
with the two previous sections, cyber exploitation by itself seems like it
would never justify a targeted nation’s use of anticipatory self-defense, the
threat of cyber attack that is posed by the vulnerabilities accessed in cyber
exploitation might in some cases justify its use.
As explained in Oppenheim’s International Law, the factors that must
be present in order for anticipatory self-defense to be appropriate are: (1)
the immediate threat of attack; (2) the urgent necessity to defensively act
against the attack; and (3) that no practicable alternative to self-defense
74
exists. Furthermore, it is requisite that the act of self-defense is
appropriately limited in scope to that which is necessary to prevent the
75
infringement. Because of the requirement that the threat of attack be
76
immediate, simply recognizing an accessed vulnerability would not seem
to be enough to justify the use of anticipatory self-defense. Under this legal
regime, the only instance in which cyber exploitation would appear to ever
justify anticipatory self-defense is in the case where both (1) a cyber
74. OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 422.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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exploitation vulnerability that can be used at a future date is located and (2)
where intelligence information that the particular vulnerability will in fact
be used for an imminent attack has been obtained.

VI. NEW LAWS FOR CYBER THREATS: CYBER EXPLOITATION AS
ESPIONAGE?
In order to account for cyber threats, specifically cyber exploitation
and its ability to easily lend itself to cyber attack, there needs to be a new or
amended set of international laws. If the same legal regime continues to be
used, the consequences could be dire.
Many of the considerations that the new laws should take into account
are the difficulties discussed previously with applying LOAC and the UN
Charter to cyber threats: the new governing laws need to take into
consideration that today’s society is heavily reliant on an infrastructure that
is controlled by information technology, that cyber weapons are easily
available and can easily be used by nonstate actors, that conflict is not just
between nations and national military forces anymore, that military and
civilian sectors are interconnected and share information technology, that
cyber exploitation is different from traditional espionage, and that the
actors of cyber attacks often cannot be identified.
The rest of this Note is primarily discusses how cyber exploitation
should be treated differently than traditional espionage. The capabilities of
cyber technology simply differ too much from those of traditional
espionage, and the ease with which the technologies for cyber exploitation
and cyber attack can be used together demands a new set of laws.

A.

Espionage Generally

According to West’s Encyclopedia of American Law, espionage is
“[t]he act of securing information of a military or political nature that a
competing nation holds secret,” and it is “commonly known as spying . . .
77
.” As stated previously, federal criminal laws prohibit the practice of
78
espionage, but it is a generally accepted activity in the international
79
community.

77. WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 72, at 299.
78. 18 U.S.C. § 793 (2006).
79. WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 72, at 299.
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Differences Between Cyber Exploitation and Traditional
Espionage

While cyber exploitation falls within the above definition of
espionage, as it is a means of obtaining secret national information, cyber
exploitation does not fit the traditional understanding of espionage, where
nations send attachés and spies in order to gather intelligence
80
information. Because cyber exploitation is so much more intrusive than
traditional espionage and can be conducted effectively by nonstate actors in
ways that can undermine a targeted nation’s infrastructure or launch an
attack on another nation, it needs to be treated as a higher concern than
traditional espionage. A 2009 investigation into a series of Chinese cyber
exploitations targeted at Tibet is an example of some of the differences
between cyber exploitation and what this Note refers to as traditional
81
espionage.
The Information Warfare Monitor conducted an in-depth investigation
of cyber exploitation against the Tibetan community, which was allegedly
82
carried out by China. The exploitation was carried out by a “malware83
based cyber espionage network” referred to as GhostNet. The GhostNet
84
system directed infected computers to download a Trojan, gh0st RAT.
Once downloaded, exploiters gained complete, real-time control of the
computer, allowing them to search and download files, as well as covertly
85
operate attached devices such as microphones and web cameras.

1. Access to Much Larger Breadth of Material
One reason cyber exploitation should be treated differently than
traditional espionage is because of the greater breadth of material that cyber
exploitation can provide access to. The more knowledge about a foreign
nation that can be obtained, the more dangerous that information can
become. In the case of GhostNet, the research team found “insecure, web86
based interfaces to four control servers.” Those interfaces then allowed
the exploiters to receive data from compromised computers, of which there
87
were at least 1,295 in at least 103 countries. Even more important, is the
80. Id.
81. See generally Tracking GhostNet: Investigating a Syber Espionage Network,
INFORMATION WARFARE MONITOR, Mar. 29, 2009, http://www.nartv.org/mirror/ghostnet.pdf
[hereinafter GhostNet].
82. Id. at 13–14.
83. Id. at 5.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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fact that around 30 percent of those infected computers were “high-value,”
including:
[T]he ministries of foreign affairs of Iran, Bangladesh, Latvia,
Indonesia, Philippines, Brunei, Barbados and Bhutan; embassies of
India, South Korea, Indonesia, Romania, Cyprus, Malta, Thailand,
Taiwan, Portugal, Germany and Pakistan; the ASEAN (Association of
Southeast Asian Nations) Secretariat, SAARC (South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation), and the Asian Development
Bank; news organizations; and an unclassified computer located at
88
NATO headquarters.”

Such massive amounts of data could not easily be gathered through
traditional means of espionage, and the number of people, time, and
resources needed to obtain that much data through the use of spies and
other traditional means would have been exorbitantly higher.

2. Much Easier and Less Expensive Access
Partly mentioned above, GhostNet is a great example of how easy and
inexpensive it can be to conduct such extensive networks for the purposes
of exploitation. As stated in the summary of the investigation into
GhostNet, “[GhostNet] demonstrates the ease by which computer-based
malware can be used to build a robust, low-cost intelligence capability and
89
infect a network of potentially high-value targets.”

3. Unknown Effects, Spread to Unintended Targets
While the problem of unintended consequences is often discussed in
relation to cyber attack, cyber exploitation can also have unintended
90
consequences. Although the exploitation may begin with a very specific
target, because of the way computers become infected and then perpetuate
the infection in order to gain access to more vulnerabilities and more
computers, the exploitation can often end up infecting unintended targets
and producing unintended results. The research team investigating
GhostNet stated that the fact that so many high value targets were identified
in GhostNet was likely coincidental, “spread by contact between
91
individuals who previously communicated through e-mail.”

4. Attribution Is Near Impossible
Even at the end of the long investigation into GhostNet, the analysis
never revealed who is in control of GhostNet, what the motivation behind
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id. at 6.
NRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 27.
GhostNet, supra note 81, at 6.
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GhostNet was, how to accurately characterize the network, or even what
92
data exactly has been exploited. Because control of some of the infected
computers has been traced to China, the most obvious explanation would
be that the Chinese state has exploited these high profile targets for military
and strategic-intelligence purposes. However, because of the uncertainty
surrounding the cyber realm, acting on that assumption would be very
93
dangerous.

5. Long Time to Investigate, Few Conclusive Answers
Furthermore, because of the problems of attribution, investigations
into cyber exploitation can go on for years and result in very little
conclusive information. For example, with GhostNet, Tibetan groups first
94
reported being targeted from servers in China back in 2002. In 2005, a
member of the investigation team began collecting and archiving samples
95
of the payloads and the social engineering used. Beginning in 2008, the
96
whole investigative team began analyzing those samples. Despite all this
work, as stated above, the investigation team has not been able to
conclusively find the actor(s) involved, determine the motivation, or find
out what data has been compromised.

VII. CONCLUSION
One difference between cyber exploitation and traditional espionage
that the GhostNet example does not illustrate is the ease with which cyber
exploitations can be equipped to carry out cyber attack. This difference,
combined with the reasons discussed previously, help illustrate how much
more threatening cyber exploitation can be compared to traditional means
of espionage. Because of this, cyber exploitation should not be treated the
same as traditional espionage, and it should, even by itself, in certain
instances be able to constitute a “threat or use of force.” And in those
instances when cyber exploitations do not rise to the level of “threat or use
of force,” which would likely be the majority of cases, those exploitations
should largely be prohibited on the international level, not just criminalized
by nations.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 48.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id.

